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Abstract: 
When philosophers recommend an attitude to death, no less than when they recommend 
the correct attitude to sex, we presume such advice to be grounded in rational 
considerations about what is natural and proper. Two things must follow: first, that there will 
be room for perverted attitudes to death; second, that some objective facts about death 
can be found to justify such an evaluation. I explore a parallel between the duality of 
psychological and biological approaches to erotic desire, regarded as the paradigm of all 
desire, and a similar duality in the fear of death, regarded as the paradigm of all aversion. 
Each invokes an objective teleological fact about their respective objects, and a 
consequent norm of correctness in our attitudes towards them. The exploration of these two 
related ideas requires that we yield as generously as possible to the temptation to believe 
them. Tolstoy's Death of Ivan Ilych can be read as a meditation that makes the temptation 
vivid. None of this succeeds in vindicating a concept of perversion. Rather, it throws into 
relief both the attraction and absurdity of countenancing any notion of perversion. 
  
  This is a special way of being afraid 
No trick dispels. Religion used to try,
That vast moth-eaten musical brocade
Created to pretend we never die,
And specious stuff that says No rational being
Can fear a thing it will not feel, not seeing
That this is what we fear—no sight, no sound,
No touch or taste or smell, nothing to think with,
Nothing to love or link with,
The anaesthetic from which none come round.
 (Philip Larkin, “Aubade”)
1. The Correct Attitude Toward Death. 
Philosophers like to warn against fools' paradises: not places where fools can safely cavort, but rather 
conditions in which fools mistakenly think themselves happy. The warning presupposes that real and 
merely apparent happiness can be told apart. Of course that claim is not altogether disinterested, since 
philosophers  have a professional investment in the distinction. Thus they have endorsed this or that 
attitude to death, holding up promises of ultimate comfort or threats of excruciating regret, to be 
dispensed at the last hour, just when the money-back guarantee expires.
 Is the philosopher's counsel any better than the threats and comforts of religion, Larkin's “old 
moth-eaten musical brocade/ created to pretend we never die”? At least the philosophical provenance 
of the advice should entitle us to expect some grounding in reasoned standards of rationality. But what 
sort of rationality? There are three broad strands.  Practical rationality aims at success in action and the 
promotion of happiness. Epistemic rationality aims at maximizing correct beliefs. Axiological rationality 
aims at something that partakes of both but is reducible to neither: appropriateness of emotional 
attitudes. Before heeding a philosopher's advice, we might wish to know whether the rational standard 
in question is practical, epistemic, or axiological. Does it regard one form of rationality as trumping all 
  
 1 others? Does it, for example, like Pascal's bet, demand that we sacrifice truth for comfort? Insofar as 
practical advice aims at securing concrete outcomes rather than truth, it needs to take account of 
contingent circumstances from which an epistemic or axiological perspective are permitted to abstract. 
Conversely, insofar as its aim is to promote comfort, practical rationality can ignore uncomfortable facts 
that axiological or epistemic rationality must face. Yet the different strands of rationality are not 
independent. Practical rationality aims at providing means to the attainment of well-being or comfort, 
and so needs to assess what counts as well-being or true comfort, which belongs to axiological 
rationality. The relevant truths—the domain of epistemic rationality—partly concern the way we shall 
feel at the moment of death as well as in the rest of life.  Those truths therefore ground both axiological 
assessments and the assessment of well-being that justify the practical advice. Truths about how we 
should feel rest upon truths about death. Both will be the focus of my concern.
2 Terminology
If there is a correct attitude to death, does the wrong attitude merit being called a perversion? The 
OED defines 'perversion' first as a “turning aside from truth or right; diversion to an improper use.” But 
as commonly used, the term is typically taken to connote something not merely undesirable, but 
immoral. I will here take it for granted, however, that Nagel (1979) and Priest (1997) have definitively 
demolished the notion, grounded in one or another moralistic version of Aristotelian teleology, that moral 
opprobrium must attach to perversion. Still, for the purposes of the following discussion I retain the idea 
that the word 'perversion' may have a use to refer to some sort of emotional deviation from truth or right 
response, particularly from a response that owes its rightness to the fact that it accords with nature. 
While such deviations, if they can be pinned down, will not automatically constitute moral failings in the 
usual sense, they may be thought to be of ethical significance on the broadest understanding of the scope 
of the ethical. I take this to include anything that promotes or impedes thriving.1  On this view there is no 
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1 The best hope for a viable notion of perversion is Freud's developmental theory, of which I gave a detailed 
discussion and a qualified defense in (de Sousa 1982). I now have less confidence than I did in the possibility of 
discovering developmental facts sufficiently general to provide universally applicable normative concepts. Hence I 
am now inclined to agree with Graham Priest that the notion of perversion, in the light of modern biology shorn of 
extraneous metaphysical baggage, is an “inapplicable concept” (Priest 1997, 371). The present paper constitutes line between ethics and aesthetics. Nor are there “purely aesthetic” considerations, for everything that 
affects well-being is ipso-facto ethically significant. It should go without saying that ethical significance in 
this broad sense can never alone provide sufficient warrant for legislation, sanction, or punishment.
The word 'death' too calls for a comment. Pollsters tell us that 55% of Americans believe in “life 
after death”. (Bishop 1999) Since that seems to commit 55% of Americans to believing a contradiction 
in terms, it's not obvious just what they mean. The belief is sensible enough if it refers to the fact that 
when dead I may, if suitably located, help to feed the daisies: so certainly there will be life after my 
death. But it won't be my life. Many people, however, seem to expect a continuation of some sort of 
individual consciousness after biological death. For those people, death is a sort of emigration, and the 
fear of death is fear of the unknown, or of risks that cannot be assessed. Nothing I say here relates to 
death as emigration, but only to death taken seriously. To take death seriously, in this sense, is to see it 
as the annihilation of individual life in all its aspects.
3 Perversion
The OED definition quoted above would not lead us to expect that ‘sexual perversion’ should 
be something of a pleonasm. In fact, though, perversion is almost always associated with sex.  (Note 
that the same doesn't hold for the concept of the perverse. It's easy to imagine saying that someone has 
a perverse attitude to death, more difficult to see what it might mean to say that someone's attitude to 
death is perverted.) When death and perversion are linked, therefore, it is natural to assume that we are 
talking about taking sexual pleasure in some aspect of death, in killing, perhaps, or in the contemplation 
of death, or in fantasies of necrophilia. This is not, I surmise, a mere accident of usage, comparable to 
the principle enunciated by an anonymous would-be neo-Fowler that ethics is about money and morals 
about sex. What might be the deeper connection?
In his classic paper, Nagel (1979) noted that the Catholic Church counts contraception as a 
perversion. On the basis of Aquinas's assumption that the emission of semen is for “the profit of 
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one last attempt to apply it anyway, motivated perhaps by a repetition compulsion symptomatic of a death-wish. For 
its upshot, I fear, is a reductio.generation, to which the union of the sexes is directed” (Thomas 1995-2000, Bk III:122), this fits the 
OED definition, though it would take an only mildly heretical believer to point out that God allowed the 
invention of contraceptive devices: what would constitute a proper use of those, if doing what they were 
designed to do doesn't count?  This may be why only the method of periodic abstinence is Papally 
condoned.  Since the body's rhythms are, unlike medical artifacts, directly designed by God, it's less 
obvious what would count as a misuse of them. Some Catholics, however, think that taking advantage 
of infertile days is a forbidden exploitation of physiological stages necessary to the procreative process. 
Anscombe (1972) invokes a subtle distinction between the intrinsic intentionality of an act and the 
intentions with which it is undertaken to justify the claim that contraception, by subverting the intrinsic 
intentionality of the sexual act, is a “sin against nature”.  
The notion of sin against nature, if it could be transposed out of its original theological key, would 
serve as a starting slogan to characterize perversion.  Let me expand a little on this slogan and comment 
briefly on what more is needed. This will also provide a preview of the line of argument to be developed 
in the present paper.
At a bare minimum, the idea of perversion presupposes teleology.  But as Nagel (1979, 39) 
rightly notes, the Church position just mentioned is particularly implausible in that it omits the mental 
element of inclination.  And while there is no longer anything mysterious about the attribution of genuine 
teleology in the absence of design (Millikan 1984, 1993), there is no requirement that the biological 
function of a mental process should be represented in any corresponding mental content.   Hence the 
existence of a biological function is not enough to raise the possibility of perversion.  A biological 
process that goes astray in such a way as to defeat is own ascertainable goal is not a perversion: we 
speak, for example, of autoimmune disease, not of a perversion of the immune system. Before a 
biological function can be perverted in desire, it must first be somehow represented in desire.  To be 
represented in desire, in turn, requires more than that there be some mechanism by which desire effects 
the required result. An analogy may clarify this. Suppose Mr. Ivanov sends Miss Keeler off to pry War 
Office secrets from Mr. Profumo.  From the point of view of Mr. Ivanov, the function of Miss Keeler's 
  
 4 activities with Mr. Profumo is to produce information about War Office secrets. But the success of the 
entreprise in no way depends on there being any awareness of that goal on the part of Mr. Profumo 
himself.  On the contrary, desires of an entirely different sort can best be relied on to secure the desired 
result. Now under certain conditions, the phenomenological content of desire might well be no less alien 
to the biological purpose which it serves than Ivanov's designs were from the desires of Profumo. And 
under such conditions the question of whether the latter actually served the former would be entirely 
separate from the question of whether, from any point of view other than that of Ivanov, it would be a 
good thing for them to do so.  
Now substitute God for Ivanov in the analogy. The point is that from the point of view of my own 
will, which is, after all, theologically warranted free, whether God's designs are a good idea is always 
open to question.   One further step away, if we substitute Nature for God, the distance between the 
two aims—Nature's and mine—is even greater, and we must conclude that there is no possibility of 
building a coherent notion of perversion. 
Chief among the assumptions required to make sense of perversion, then, is the idea that a 
proper function of an organ or type of behaviour is there to be discovered. And prior to that, in turn, is 
the assumption that the relevant facts of the matter can be discerned. But in the case of sex as of death, 
what are those facts? A threat of circularity lurks when we ask this question, since we must be 
concerned not with just any facts (there are plenty of facts about sexuality and death that presumably 
would not be thought by either side of the dispute to cast any light on the propriety of this or that 
emotional attitude), but only the relevant facts. But the difficulty lies precisely in articulating what sort of 
facts might be relevant to the appropriateness of emotional  attitudes.  So I shall need to address the 
question of whether it is possible to discern relevant facts about death. First, however, in the hope of 
exploiting the analogy, I shall explore the association of perversion with sex. 
Sexual desire isn't just one inclination among others.  It is emblematic of the very notion of desire 
itself. Three features help to explain the centrality of the erotic in the concepts of desire and perversion: 
its phenomenological salience, its polymorphism, and an inherent ambiguity between the 
phenomenological and biological levels at which it may be described. 
  
 5 (i) Phenomenological salience.   It has been a recurrent trope, from Plato to Freud, that the erotic 
is of the essence of desire even when the desire does not aim at reproduction or even at genital 
satisfaction.  Phenomenologically, sexual desire is a paradigm of desire.  We may see evidence for this 
in the fact that intrigues of love form the core of most story plots; but that is not always true, and the 
exceptions to that generalization are equally instructive.  Darnton (1984) shows that the pursuit of food, 
not sex, is the single most important driving motivation in most of the folk stories collected by Charles 
Perrault in 18th Century France.  We may infer that when food is chronically lacking, its pursuit 
becomes more important than the pursuit of sex.  Even then, however, the quest for food does not 
acquire the paradigmatic status of the erotic.  The evidence for this fact, I suggest, lies precisely in the 
fact that the quest for food does not appear to give rise to any perversions.  Nagel observed that one 
might work to construct a notion of gastronomical perversion.  But the result is somewhat forced and 
corresponds to no common notion.  Why should this be?  
One reason is that the sort of variation to which our tastes in food are subject differs from the 
sorts of variation possible in sex. There seem to be two key differences.  One is that our interest in food, 
unlike our erotic desires, does not involve a complex process of development, of which only a relatively 
late stage actually provides nutrition. It follows that there are fewer opportunities for arrested 
development,  changes in behavioural aims, and vagaries in the target objects selected.2   For that 
reason our attitudes to food do not often involve emotions.  Passionately held food taboos are, of 
course, the exceptions that prove the rule, since in those cases the moralistic attitudes that confront 
transgressions are much closer to those that tend to be opposed to sexual “deviance”.   A second 
reason is that the link between the biological function of hunger and its phenomenal character is direct, 
whereas the link between the ostensible object of erotic desire and its biological teleology can remain 
entirely hidden from view.  When I am hungry, what I want is nourishment; and my desire for 
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2 Nagel suggest as an examples of gastronomical perversion a form of fetishism that would consist in a desire to eat 
pictures of food, "or if when hungry he sought satisfaction by fondling a napkin or ashtray from his favorite 
restaurant."  (1969, p. 41).  A closer parallel to some of Freud's own examples would be an exclusive taste for thin 
sweet milk, marking a fixation at at early stage of the development of taste.nourishment is precisely the means selected by nature to procure it.  When I experience erotic desire, on 
the other hand, I may well have no thought whatever of the goal for which nature has instilled that 
particular desire in me.  As will shortly become clear, this last fact will play a crucial role in the present 
argument.
(ii) Polymorphism.   The fact that psychoanalysis accords a privileged position to erotic desire in 
our mental economy might be viewed in a deflationary spirit.  Grant that the erotic is a powerful 
example of desire, and allow that free association leads unerringly from any non-sexual or “sublimated” 
desire to sexual thoughts.  The inference that apparently unrelated desires are somehow really sexual 
may be just an illusion.  It could simply be that since sexual desires are among most people's salient 
preoccupations, free association leads naturally to those thoughts from virtually any starting point.  It's 
not that free association is the Royal Road to the Unconscious where sexual fantasies lie hidden by 
repression; rather, it's that sexual fantasies lie all over the place, so that any random walk will find them. 
Illusory or not, the central role of erotic desire in mental economy can be interpreted in two ways.  
In the narrowly Freudian interpretation, “sublimated” desires retain their essential erotic nature. Their 
ostensible objects are for non-sexual aims, typically for achievements of an aesthetic, social, business or 
moral nature, thus manifesting transformations of the ostensible nature of desire; but the essential erotic 
energy that provides their driving force remains unchanged. On the contrasting view, associated with 
Jung, a determinable original desire underlies both the erotic and the other modes of desire. The sexual 
form of desire does not constitute a more basic, original or authentic form of desire, but is merely one 
specific form among others.3 
From the phenomenological point of view, there is little to choose between these two views. They 
can be distinguished only when regarded from a different perspective, where what is salient is not the 
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3 Some light may be thrown on the difference by comparing it with the contrast between two ways in which two Pre-
Socratic philosophers thought of the relation between the variety of determinate phenomena and the underlying 
reality.. Anaximander thought of it as arising from an essentially indeterminate but determinable root, the apeiron. 
Anaximenes, by contrast, thought of the basic stuff as being fully determinate in nature but admitting of 
transformations in observable form, leaving its essence intact—it is always air—while modifying its appearance. For 
Anaximenes, different observable material substances are just states of air in different degrees of concentration and 
rarefaction. Jung's view is akin to Anaximander's, Freud's to that of Anaximenes. phenomenology of desire but the biology that underlies it. From this biological point of view, Freud's 
conception makes sense, while Jung's is seen to be nothing but metaphysical fancy. On the other hand, a 
Jungian—or an existentialist—could charge that moving to the biological point of view simply amounts 
to changing the subject. 
(iii) The Biological and the Phenomenological   The conflict between the Freudian and the Jungian 
view of desire stems from the fact that psychological states may be viewed under two aspects: in terms 
of what is phenomenologically intrinsic, or in terms of what is biologically instrumental. Actually 
there are two contrasts here. Like all our “natural” desires, the aims of sexual desire are arranged 
hierarchically: when regarded as causes or explanations, they can be remote or proximate. In relation 
to one another, psychological explanations are typically proximate and biological explanations typically 
remote. But this contrast doesn't exhaust the ambiguity, for while there is a sense in which biology aims 
to provide remote explanations, an aim can also be more or less proximal or remote either at the 
phenomenological level or at the biological level. To illustrate the former, consider Robert Solomon's 
claim that all emotions share a higher-level aim: “self-esteem is the goal of every passion” (Solomon 
1984, 97). In the same phenomenological vein, one might claim, at a naïve first approximation, that the 
aim of sexual desire is pleasure. Or more inventively, one could find with Nagel that the essence of 
sexual desire lies in an elaborate game of mutual recognition, attributing to desire something like the 
structure that for Grice (1967) defined linguistic intercourse. The problem with all of these suggestions is 
that their very variety underscores their arbitrariness.4
The distinction between proximate and remote causes can also be made on the biological side 
alone.  Proximate causes, however—the physiological mechanisms targeted by Viagra, say—need not 
concern us here.  Proximate mechanisms underlying sexual desire as a functional unit must in turn be 
explained by their remote goal of reproduction, which in some sense they share will all other basic 
desires. But how is this remote biological aim related to the phenomenological content of desire? Can 
sexual desire really be seen as a desire for reproduction? 
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4 For two alternatives to Nagel's proposal about the phenomenological essence of sex, see Solomon (1974) and Although ‘sexual reproduction’ is a standard phrase, it glosses over the fact that there is, in fact, 
no such thing as reproduction among sexual animals. All so-called reproduction might better be called 
‘production’ of a novel individual. Even if conservative politicians were persuaded to approve human 
cloning, the true replication of a complex human being is not a possibility. There is therefore no point in 
my desiring to reproduce myself.5 
What we call reproduction, is in fact just the production of another bearer of some of one's genes. 
That outcome is not impossible to want; but wanting it presupposes knowledge and concepts that most 
humans never had—let alone our pre-human ancestors. It lies on the far side of a gulf between the 
biological and the phenomenological which Freud starkly described: 
Biology teaches that ... two views, seemingly equally well-founded, may be taken of the relation 
between the ego and sexuality. On one view, the individual is the principal thing, sexuality is one 
of its activities, and satisfaction one of its needs; while on the other view the individual is a 
temporary and transient appendage to the quasi-immortal germ plasm, which is entrusted to him 
by the process of generation. (Freud 1915, 123)
But again, what exactly would the relation between these “two views” need to be like to be 
relevant to the question of perversion? How, if at all, does the biological teleology of sexuality enter into 
the phenomenology of individual desire? 
The short answer to this last question is probably not at all. For natural selection neither needs to 
build, nor could it possibly have built, any correlative of the biological function of sex into the 
phenomenology of desire.  Natural selection does not need to program any representation of 
reproduction into desire, providing that the actual content of individual desires leads on the whole to 
creatures behaving in such a way as to promote the biological end of reproduction.  And from the 
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Moulton (1976)
5 All this is neatly summed up in Woody Allen's quip: “I don't want to achieve immortality through my work [or, he 
might have added, through cloning or children]: I want to achieve immortality through not dying.”biological point of view that is just as well, for it could not succeed if it needed to.  The reason is that for 
a creature even to contemplate the propagation of genetic material of which they are the vehicle as a 
possible target of desire, they would have to be language-users equipped with a good deal of scientific 
knowledge and philosophical reflectiveness.  
Before there was desire, nature had to make do with tropisms: the effectiveness of mechanisms 
inducing reproductive behaviour could hardly afford to wait for articulate desire.  Instead, we can 
suppose that the propensity to do whatever would lead to reproduction was cobbled together from 
more elementary tendencies, instincts, and desires.  Freud's story of the gradual integration of 
“component instincts”, originally relating to different parts of the body and embodying their own specific 
aims (Freud 1905), while speculative and unlikely to be correct in detail, undoubtedly fits the sort of 
way that the “tinkering” of natural selection operates.  Even when sexual desire is as articulate as it can 
be, and fully integrated into what Freud regarded as the culminating phase of “genitality”, there remains a 
sense in which the content of our desires may never perfectly match the biological teleology that 
underlies them.  And in the very consciousness of our explicit human desires it is perhaps not fanciful to 
suppose an obscure awareness of the serendipitous relation between the content of our desires and the 
ultimate energy that enables the attainment of their object.6  
Given the cleavage between the ostensible object of my desire and the biological functions which 
it serves, there is no justification for looking to the underlying biology, any more than to God, for a 
principle of distinction between normal and perverted desire. 
The gap between the aim of phenomenological desire the biological aim that underlies it implies 
not only a divergence but a potential conflict between the goals properly attributable to the individual as 
such and those attributable to “the species”, or better no one in particular.7 There is no contradiction in 
maintaining both that natural selection didn't need to select for a desire to reproduce members of the 
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6 See (de Sousa 1998) for an exploration of some of the ways in which we never quite get what we want.
7  This is noted by a character in G.B. Shaw's Back to Methuselah, who protests that entrusting sex to the whims of 
individual attraction is no more reasonable than a general would be who refused to kill anyone whom he didn't 
personally hate. species as such, and that the individual desires it did foster might conflict with the biological goal of 
doing so. But lest it might seem to be the case, it should suffice to recall that the environment that shaped 
us is no longer ours. Moreover, where such conflict arises between individual goals and remote 
biological teleology, the latter can make no claim, worthy of being regarded as legitimate from the point 
of view of the individual, to trump the aims defined by individual desire.
4. Death
Fascination with death takes the form both of dread and of longing. For each, some more or less 
implausible biological roots have been postulated.  If there is a correct emotion in the face of death, it 
might therefore be sought in either or both of two antagonistic attitudes.
The less obvious is desire for death, erected by (Freud 1920) as Thanatos, a Death Instinct 
symmetrical and counterpoised with Eros.  The inspiration for its alleged discovery lay in his observation 
of repetition compulsions, particularly in soldiers re-living war traumata.  These plainly lay “beyond the 
pleasure principle”, and seemed equally inexplicable in terms of the “reality principle” which represented 
the mature transform of the pleasure principle.  Freud leapt to the conclusion that they were governed 
by an equally goal-directed principle the aim of which was a return to a previous condition.  Since the 
ultimate previous condition of life is non-existence, Freud concluded that “the aim of all life is death” 
(Freud 1920, 38). 
On Freud's view, the death instinct is located at a deep biological level. Thanatos is at the heart of 
all desire for nothingness, whether for oneself, as manifested not only in a desire for death but in 
repetition-compulsions, or—in a sort of perverse altruism—for others, when turned outward and 
manifested as aggression.  But its stratospheric level of generality strips Thanatos of any scrap of 
biological reality. It is ascribed to all living matter as such, all the way down to individual living cells 
which Freud fancied were seized with a longing for extinction.  Freud sometimes writes bizarrely as if 
the whole of nature echoed Sonia's last words in Chekhov's Uncle Vanya: “We shall rest, we shall 
rest.”  As Jonathan Lear points out, Freud seems to have been so committed to his search for meaning 
in the apparently meaningless texture of life, that he “could not really grasp ... that some mental activity 
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toward finding hidden and deeper purposes.” (Lear 2000, 80). Thus he entirely missed the possibility 
that not only in mentality but also in biology, some phenomena manifest a complete absence of 
teleology.  Any mechanism may malfunction, and at least some malfunctions are wholly devoid of 
meaning.   In terms of a now familiar metaphor  unavailable to Freud, we might say that a computer 
malfunction due to a programming error could produce a perversion of meaning; but one due to a 
hardware failure may result in anomalies in output that are not usefully interpreted as having any kind of 
meaning at all.   Breakdowns in the machinery produce not perversions of meaning, but absence of 
meaning.
Still, it might be suggested, even if we grant that the “compulsion to repeat” which Freud 
interprets as a desire for death actually has no meaning at the individual level, perhaps it has meaning at 
the other level, that of the “quasi-immortal germ plasm”.  In this vein, popular accounts of evolution 
sometimes attempt to “explain” death as being necessitated to make room for natural selection to 
produce new forms. We can dismiss this notion as a naive application of pseudo-teleological thinking, of 
the sort that cannot be reconciled with the logic of natural selection. For the reproductive success of a 
gene for self-extinction would necessarily be inversely proportional to its effectiveness.  The null 
hypothesis or default assumption about death requires not that there be a goal of function of death, but 
merely that no teleology justifies the cost of prolonging the lives of individuals.  Maintaining organisms in 
a state of good repair takes resources, particularly in the form of redundancy of genetic information to 
protect the integrity of phenotypic copies from small copying errors in the genotype of somatic cells.  
Once their task of passing on their genetic heritage has likely been accomplished, the replication of 
somatic cells can safely be allowed to degenerate or cease, and individual organisms can be allowed to 
perish.  
Nevertheless, there is in fact some reason to think that the null hypothesis is false:  that individuals 
in metazoan lineages, as well as individual cells, are programmed to die, in a manner that results from 
selection. The segregation of somatic from sex cells promotes a division of labour, in which the former 
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replication. The somatic cells, and with them the individual, are therefore programmed to die and so 
prevented both from competing with the sexual line, to which endless replication is entrusted, and from 
degenerating to a cancerous condition that would impair the orderly transmission of the sexual line. 
(Clark 1996, de Sousa 2000b).
It seems clear that this process, while it might seem to give comfort to the notion of a Death 
Instinct, is unlikely to be reflected in the intentional object of any desire.  The argument made earlier 
about the essential gap between the biological level and the level of phenomenal desire applies a fortiori 
to any teleology of self-destruction that might be read into the programmed mechanism of apoptosis, the 
orderly self-immolation of cells.  What is programmed in the cell does not need to be echoed at the level 
of the consciousness or intentionality of the individual organism.  Nor is it easy to conceive of a putative 
mechanism or even an abstract selection pressure that might lead to its being so represented.   In any 
case, as I shall argue in a moment, there are further reasons for thinking that death cannot have been set 
up by natural selection as an object of either fear or desire. 
Jonathan Lear has objected to the parallel between Eros and Thanatos in the following terms: 
... herein lies a crucial difference between love and death: within the human realm love is itself a 
psychological force; death is not. Death remains a purely biological force from which 
psychological consequences, like aggression, are supposed to flow. For a worthy opponent to 
love, Freud should have chosen hate or strife; a force which in the human realm is psychological.  
(Lear 1990, 14)
This is right about death but wrong about love. By the time the death instinct makes its appearance in 
Freud's thought, Eros, perhaps precisely in order to preserve a symmetry with Thanatos, has lost its 
specificity to become a generalized life instinct, at the heart not only of sexual desire but of something 
like the Spinozistic/Nietzschean struggle to continue in existence.  The  radical disconnection between 
the underlying biological construct and the phenomenological reality of the corresponding attitude 
pertains no less to love than death.  So Lear has failed to single out a difference between the two. His 
  
 13 diagnosis should not then deter us from pursuing the parallel: this I shall do, after a brief detour. 
5. Amélie Rorty's Paradox
A striking paradox proffered by Amélie Rorty will bring us back to the question of the rationality 
of fearing death. The fear of death as annihilation, she has boldly argued, is both rational and 
irrational. (Rorty 1988).
First, for the reason Epicurus gave, it is indeed irrational to fear annihilation. For before I die, I do 
not experience death because I am alive. But when I am dead, no “I” is left to experience anything. So 
there is no such experience to be feared as death.
A standard objection is that Epicurus is simply begging the question.  His argument presupposes 
that we cannot rationally care about a condition that one will never experience. But his conclusion entails 
this, and so can't reasonably rest on it. That is the basis of Larkin's complaint: the argument is “specious” 
because annihilation, the absence of all sentience, is precisely what we fear. 
The crux of Epicurus's argument is this: “Whatever causes no annoyance when it is present, 
causes only a groundless pain in the expectation.”8 This is essentially an application of  the Philebus 
Principle, which requires that a pleasure of anticipation should be proportional to the anticipated 
pleasure to which it relates. (de Sousa 2000a)  This must be construed as a normative principle, not 
just as an observation about the relation of expectation to its object.  One might rationalize the Philebus 
principle along pragmatic lines.  If our annoyance or our pleasure in anticipation were uncorrelated with 
the annoyance or pleasure afforded by the event itself, our motivation would have an essentially random 
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8 The whole of Epicurus's famous argument in the Letter to Menoeceus reads as follows:
Accustom yourself to believing that death is nothing to us, for good and evil imply the capacity for sensation, and 
death is the privation of all sentience; therefore a correct understanding that death is nothing to us makes the 
mortality of life enjoyable, not by adding to life a limitless time, but by taking away the yearning after immortality. 
For life has no terrors for him who has thoroughly understood that there are no terrors for him in ceasing to live. 
Foolish, therefore, is the man who says that he fears death, not because it will pain when it comes, but because it 
pains in the prospect. Whatever causes no annoyance when it is present, causes only a groundless pain in the 
expectation. Death, therefore, the most awful of evils, is nothing to us, seeing that, when we are, death is not come, 
and, when death is come, we are not. It is nothing, then, either to the living or to the dead, for with the living it is 
not and the dead exist no longer.effect on our planning. This consideration may constitute a plausible hypothesis about the biological 
origin of our endorsement of the Philebus principle and its function.  But that doesn't mean it ever enters 
into the content of our anticipation, any more than the biological root of erotic desire enters into the 
intentional object of our desires.   Nevertheless, it is not inconceivable that it might have a role in explicit 
deliberation.  In that case, it would serve the individual's long-term interests rather than those of some 
remote biological function. In this respect the Philebus principle fares better than any of the teleological 
principles so far mentioned.  But this would work only  provided we had sufficient control of our 
experience of pleasure for it to make a difference.  That possibility seems rather slim.  Still, it provides 
an example of how a biological teleology might actually enter into the content of a desire or emotion. 
Rorty's quarrel with Epicurus, however, appeals to a more fundamental biological perspective, 
stressing the fitness-enhancing function of the fear of death. She argues that the fear of death is an 
inevitable concomitant of the existence of dispositions to “functional fears,” which are as biologically 
useful as pain. So, Rorty concludes, it is both rational and irrational to fear death, because “the two 
sides of the argument are not commensurable; they cannot be weighed and summarized in such a way as 
to allow us to determine what is, all things considered, the rational attitude towards death.” (Rorty 2000, 
210)
What exactly is the locus of incommensurability? One possibility derives from the way in which 
we may compute the rationality of our preferences.  In Bayesian decision theory,  all our choices can be 
construed as implementing preferences for gambles blending subjective probabilities and desirabilities. A 
finite number of explicit choices will suffice to ground the ascription to an agent of a unique preference 
ranking.  (Jeffrey 1965) This can be used either descriptively, in order to predict a person's decision on 
a new question, or critically, in the ascription of an incoherence in the individual's preference rankings. 
So life choices can be assessed in terms of the desirabilities of various options, weighted by 
probabilities, constructed in the light of past choices.
But since death represents the end of projects (the end of time for me, one might say) my past 
choices provide no guidance. For most of us have previously made no choice amounting to the absence 
  
 15 of all experience, (as opposed to the choice between one sort of experience and another). In this sense, 
then, for Bayesian decision theory, death is an absolutely incomparable choice.  It must then follow that 
a choice of death cannot be deemed either rational or irrational. No attitude toward death can be 
meaningfully described as correct even in the narrow sense of being consonant with all or most of my 
previous choices. Nor can any therefore be decried as perverted. 
This way of looking at incommensurability has an important virtue. It refers the question of 
rationality to the individual subject, not to any general truth which then must fit each individual merely by 
virtue of their belonging to the species.  Rorty goes further, however, and frames the argument in entirely 
general and quasi-Kantian terms:
[a] mind capable of certain kinds of causal reasoning cannot restrict the use of such reasoning 
.... Reifying the totality of experience, illicitly treating it as if it could itself be a possible object of 
experience, we ask questions that are appropriate only within experience .... Similarly we ask 
these questions about the simple unified soul, the subject of experience reified as what it cannot 
be: an object of possible experience. These questions are both inevitable and illicit: they are built 
into the operations of rational inference, and yet are improper and meaningless.  (Rorty, ibid.)
In Rorty's view, then, incommensurability is traced to the fact that the reasons to fear and the reasons 
not to fear death belong to different perspectives, or indeed to different orders of explanation.  They 
relate respectively to proximate-psychological and remote-biological facts, and thus return us to the 
parallel with the duality of Eros. 
6. The fear of death:  biology and phenomenology 
If sexual desire is the paradigm of desire, it might be said that fear of death is the paradigm of 
aversion. If so, then we might wonder whether the features listed earlier might find an echo—reversing 
the valence—in our attitudes to death:
(i) Phenomenological salience. Phenomenologically, fear of death is the paradigm of fear. While 
there's life, there's hope, we say. Death is the ultimate threat. No wonder it figures as the other chief 
  
 16 engine of novel and movie plots, second only to sex. The interest aroused by stories featuring the 
menace of death does not need to be explained in terms of any special preoccupations of readers and 
moviegoers.
(ii) Polymorphism.  It might further be held that the dread of death lies at the heart of our other 
fears, even when it does not seem to be so. Our awareness is not always the best guide here, so that we 
may not be immediately aware that our fear is not what it seems, just as we aren't always aware 
of—indeed, many insistently deny—the fact that the erotic might lurk behind other more “innocent” 
desires.  Similarly, the anxiety that forms the aversive core of pain is usually assumed to be identical with 
the sensation of pain, and yet there is evidence that certain analgesics of the opiate family make it 
possible to feel a painful sensation without experiencing any intense aversion (Dennett 1978, 208). 
Phenomenologically, the centrality of the fear of death relates to an awareness that if the threat of 
death did not lie behind other forms of harm, then those other harms could not be absolutely serious. 
When reprieve is certain, there can be no true tragedy. But here, as in the case of sexuality, we can 
again ask two questions.  First, is there an underlying biological level which can account for the 
phenomenology of our attitude to death? Second, if there is, can we conceive of that biological level 
being represented in the phenomenology of our attitudes to death? Only if this second question can be 
answered in the affirmative, might we give meaning to possibility that some attitudes to death are 
contrary to nature, and hence perverted. 
(iii) The Biological and the Phenomenological   Why do we die?  The question stems from the 
vestiges of an infantile or religious assumption that every causal question has a teleological answer. This 
assumption, which as we saw Freud is too ready to make, is biologically gratuitous. Still, as we saw, 
there may be a sense in which organisms are indeed programmed to die—rather than simply allowed to 
perish in accordance with the most plausible alternative hypothesis.  Even then, however, an organism 
needs to be programmed to last long enough to do its job as a gene survival machine.9 A healthy fear of 
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9 The metaphor comes from (Dawkins 1976, 21)specific dangers that might prematurely threaten the germ line's somatic vehicle therefore does need to 
be programmed in. It is difficult to see how natural selection could have had any direct influence on an 
emotion that has as its intentional object death-as-the-annihilation-of-the-individual. For that requires 
a conceptual base we cannot easily ascribe to non-language-using animals, including our pre-linguistic 
ancestors. For the following argument, I submit, establishes that pre-linguistic animals cannot fear their 
own annihilation:
1.  An animal could not take something to be a cause that it cannot conceptualize. 
2.  The individual's annihilation could not be conceptualized by a being incapable of 
conceptualizing itself as an individual that might not exist.  
3.  A being incapable of language could not conceptualize itself as an individual that might cease 
to exist. We must distinguish the conception of one's possible extinction from the fear of present 
danger. Rorty's “functional fears” can be only of the latter sort, which can be and obviously are 
felt by other animals; the former, by contrast, requires one to hold in mind, as it were, a calendar 
of future and possible times, without any perceptible links to the present moment.  And that calls 
the sorts of representational devices that allow us to refer to what is absent: broadly speaking, a 
capacity for language. 
4.  Therefore natural selection couldn't have detected dread of non-being as such in our pre-
linguistic forebears. Instead, it will have selected for all kinds of dispositions to fear in the face of 
dangers, some of which would have been lethal in fact, but none of which could be apprehended 
as such.
Modern humans' capacity to conceive of annihilation makes it possible to dread it; but it doesn't 
suddenly make any more intelligible the awareness of annihilation as an object of dread. Once we do 
become capable of conceiving of non-being, the nameless atavistic dread selected as a response to 
danger is focused on the prospect of non-being, and the Epicurean consolation is dismissed as “spurious 
stuff”.10 But that dismissal isn't necessarily rational.
  
 18 There is another, closely related argument that suggests that annihilation can't be the true object of 
my fear.11 The relevant sense of fear is one which amounts to more than merely having a negative 
attitude to a possible state of affairs. Fear demands that I apprehend its object from a subjective point 
of view, from my own standpoint. But in the case of death that means I can't really imagine what I 
allegedly fear.  For nothing can count as imagining something from my own standpoint, if there can't be 
such a thing as my own standpoint in the situation I supposedly imagine. 
It might be objected that I might fear something despite being unable to imagine it.  But that does 
not do justice to the nature of fear, which is triggered not by abstract propositional conceptions but by 
perception or imagination.  It is difficult to see how one might actually experience fear if one were unable 
in any way to imagine the feared prospect. But since there is nothing it is like to be dead, nothing can 
count as imagining myself being dead.
One last line of resistance is possible.  It might be claimed that it is not after all impossible for a 
non-existent object to be the object of an emotion. For the object of an emotion can be identified in a 
rough and ready way as what that subject takes to be its cause.  And since I may falsely take 
something that doesn't exist for a cause of my fear, I can imagine the impossible. 
Even granting that, however, there seems to be a clear sense in which I am mistaken about the 
object of my fear in all such cases.  I conclude that our fear of our own death is always mistaken in its 
object. Even if these arguments fail to carry conviction, the fear of annihilation cannot be a fear 
conditioned by natural selection. It is best thought of as “grafted” onto more atavistic fears directed at 
other more specific threats. So we can draw a conclusion that exactly parallels that drawn above about 
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10 Or is replaced with a consoling delusion. It seems to be an anthropological truism that our ancestors' accession to 
the status of homo sapiens was more or less simultaneous with the invention of religion.  Very likely we became 
psychologically incapable of taking annihilation seriously precisely as we became intellectually capable of 
conceiving our own death. On the verge of conceiving of death, our ancestors sanitized it and reconceptualized it as 
a mere change of state (Burkert 1996).
11 This argument was suggested to me by Patricia Greenspan, but I have recast it in terms that she may not agree 
with.the necessary disconnection between the biology and the phenomenology of desire:  Natural selection 
did not need to build, and could not possibly have built, any correlative of the biological function 
of death into the phenomenology of the fear of death.
7. Tolstoy and the Temptation of Objectivity
I have so far been mainly concerned with the question whether a biological level of teleology can 
be imported into the experience of desire. If it could, we might be able to justify labelling certain desires 
as perverted on the ground that they deviate from their proper nature as reflecting their distal biological 
end.  The quest for a plausible case in point has so far been in vain.  But the failure of that approach 
suggests that we might do better to tackle the phenomenology of death directly, emulating Nagel's 
approach to the phenomenology of erotic desire. This would require us to turn our back on biology and 
seek some phenomenological essence in the contemplation of death. Nagel's treatment of sexual 
perversion shows that such a quest is likely to be suggestive, but vulnerable: for any demurral risks 
exposing its pronouncements as incurably arbitrary. The persuasiveness of a claim to have discovered 
the phenomenological essence of death will likely result from literary skill rather than argumentative 
cogency, but perhaps it is none the worse for that. For philosophers are not alone, of course, in urging 
certain attitudes towards death. So have poets and novelists. Tolstoy's story “The death of Ivan Ilych” is 
a brilliant example: a meditation on death designed to offer a lesson about the proper attitude to death. It 
can be read as a warning, an argument, intended to change the reader's attitudes, perhaps to change the 
reader's life. It works by building an emotional conviction about the true nature of death, and the correct 
attitude to death. 
Crudely exploited as argument, Tolstoy's story can thus be read as putting forward a number of 
theses.12 These cluster around multiple kinds of “falsity”: “He was so surrounded and involved in a 
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12 Most of the intelligible points that can be extracted from Heidegger's turgid chapter on death in (Heidegger 1962) 
are to be found in Tolstoy's lucid and compelling story. Heidegger's chapter, though it may well be among the more 
powerful parts of his work and passes for one of the most important philosophical discussions of death, can 
therefore safely be ignored, except by those who are entranced by the aesthetic appeal of insights of middling 
quality, once swaddled into a  weight of pompous and obscurantist convolutions.mesh of falsity that it was hard to unravel anything.” (Tolstoy 1960, 139. All references are to this 
edition.) This falsity includes denial of his own death:  “The syllogism he had learnt from 
Kiezewetter's Logic: ‘Caius is a man, men are mortal, therefore Caius is mortal,’ had always 
seemed to him correct as applied to Caius, but certainly not as applied to himself....  If I had to 
die like Caius I should have known it was so. An inner voice would have told me so, but there 
was nothing of the sort....” (129); and denial of his death by others (“he knew very well they were 
all lying and why they were lying.” (138) ). But most importantly it consists in inauthenticity in his 
attitudes to life and death: Ilych had been particularly proud of his gift for “separating his official 
duties from his private life.” (104); but now he asks: “What if my whole life has really been 
wrong?” (148). And again: “In them he saw himself—all that for which he had lived—saw clearly 
that it was not real at all, but a terrible and huge deception which had hidden both life and 
death.”(149). 
Part of what constitutes this deception consists in the fact that he suppressed the knowledge of his 
own bad choices by submitting to social norms and conventions.
At school he had done things which had formerly seemed to him very horrid and made him 
feel disgusted with himself... but when later on he saw that such actions were done by 
people of good position and that they did not regard them as wrong, he was able not 
exactly to regard them as right, but to forget about them entirely or not be at all troubled 
at remembering them.” (103)
and again: 
 It occurred to him that his scarcely perceptible attempts to struggle against what was 
considered good by the most highly placed people, those scarcely noticeable impulses 
which he had immediately suppressed, might have been the real thing, and all the rest 
false.” (148-149)
Near death, and despite the isolating character of death, (124, 146) Ilych seems to lose his 
defining selfishness, and thereby finds a kind of joy:  “Suddenly it grew clear to him that what had 
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he must act so as not to hurt them, release them....” (152) 
This last passage raises a doubt: Is Tolstoy cheating? Is he refusing, in the end, to take death 
seriously in the sense earlier defined? (External evidence about Tolstoy's religion makes this probable.)  
But if we ignore that disqualifying possibility, we can focus on another element implicit in Tolstoy's 
ending. I refer to a tendency to believe that the dying see life more clearly than the living. This is a 
not uncommon prejudice, reflected in Samuel Johnson's famous remark that “when any man knows he is 
to be hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates his mind wonderfully.” But why should changes in attitude 
brought by the proximity of death be assumed to have any special authority? Should we espouse a 
maxim of in morte veritas with any more confidence than we endorse in vino veritas? Perhaps, in 
truth, our attitude to death when death is near is simply akratic: like the addict's reversal of long term 
preference as the fix approaches. We prefer not to believe that, no doubt, because the dying seldom get 
a second chance to revise their judgments and we incline to attribute disproportionate weight to final 
judgments. Perhaps we are obscurely aware that in our evaluation of any stretch of time, we allow the 
last moments to outweigh nearly all others in our assessment of the whole. (Kahneman 2000, 6).  But 
after death there will be no retrospection, and it's not obvious why we should prefer to think we were 
right for a few minutes after being wrong our whole life long, rather than the other way around.
8. Conclusion
Affecting though it be, Tolstoy's moral carries conviction only as long as it is unexamined. We saw 
that Epicurus, in the end, fares no better. The power and simplicity of his argument diverts attention from 
its question-begging character. But that is just a characteristic that must probably be shared by just any 
meditation on death. Here, to recapitulate, is why. 
Whether the favoured attitude is dread (Larkin), authenticity and selflessness (Tolstoy), longing 
(Freud) or Olympian equanimity (Epicurus), all these demand to be grounded in relevant facts about 
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from a distortion of the true nature of death, and likely to impede our best chances of thriving. What is 
the right emotional attitude to some phenomenon depends on the objective truth of the phenomenon. 
But the converse also holds: our emotional reaction to it, when brought to the right level of intensity, and 
not dulled by social conformities, is itself partly constitutive of that objective reality. To what extent can 
a philosophical analysis like that of Epicurus or a meditation like Tolstoy's get us out of that circle? Can 
it actually form the basis of a criticism of an emotional attitude? If it can, it must be on the basis of some 
independent principle of rationality focusing not on any intrinsic quality of appropriateness-to-a-given-
intentional-object, but on some transition or relation, something like an inferential principle which if 
violated will lead to some sort of absurdity.  And it seems that any such putative principle of rationality is 
likely to fall between two stools. Either it will find roots in biology that cannot figure as contents of 
desire; or else it will rely on the flimsily cantilevered intuitions of free-floating phenomenology.  Even a 
purely analytic meditation like that of Epicurus ends up being uneasily moralistic, as talk of perversions in 
regions closer to that concept's usual habitat are wont to be.
The totality of a given individual's attitudes may be more or less well integrated, more or less 
conducive to that individual's thriving, more or less in harmony with those of the individual's social 
environment. To label as perversions those attitudes and desires that lie at one end of any of those 
ranges of variation is not informative, and only risks misleading with its attendant remnants of moral 
connotations.  For there is no court that is competent to pass judgment on our attitudes and emotions 
towards sex and death, other than the effort of bringing into reflective equilibrium, individually and 
collectively, the very attitudes and emotions we propose to assess.
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